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In the principal case the Appellate Division, in holding that the
testimony of the crew on the eastbound train failed to raise an issue
of fact on the question of defendant's negligence, relied chiefly on
two cases, Foley v. N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R.9 and Culhane v.
N. Y. Central & H. R. R. R.,10 which stand for the proposition that
testimony negative in character does not raise an issue, as against
affirmative testimony, when it appears that the attention of the witness so testifying was not directed to the fact at the time. In the
Foley case it appeared that the position of the witnesses was unfavorable, while in the Culhane case the witnesses were the parties struck
by the train.
It is to be observed that the instant case is distinguishable from
both the Culhane and Foley decisions. In the Culhane case the plaintiff's agent was the witness, while here the witnesses were disinterested parties. In the Foley case the witnesses were not in a
favorable position, while in the principal case it appears from the
evidence that the eastbound train was abreast of the westbound at the
time the warning is alleged to have been sounded. The trainmen
aboard the eastbound were thus in such proximity to the whistle
that, in the nature of things, they probably would have heard it had
it been sounded, or so a jury might have found.
It is submitted that the court, recognizing from the nature of
the affirmative and negative testimony offered that reasonable minds
could differ on the presence or absence of a warning signal, was
correct in referring the question of defendant's negligence to a jury.

FALSE IMPRISONMENT-

RESTRAINT OF MENTALLY ILL PER-

SONS.-At the instance of the husband, defendant psychiatrist visited
the plaintiff wife. After the husband told of alleged violent threats
made by the wife, which she denied, the defendant called the police.
The plaintiff refused to go with the police because they bad no warrant. They nevertheless overpowered her and took her to a hospital
from which she was later released as sane. The police had acted
upon the defendant's representation of her insanity and under his
direction. Plaintiff brought suit for false imprisonment. The District of Columbia Code permits the arrest of an alleged mentally ill
person without a warrant, if found in a public place; I or if the person
proached the crossing. There was also testimony of the conductor, engineer
and fireman that the whistle was blown. As the majority of plaintiff's witnesses were so located that they would probably have heard the whistle if it
had been blown, there was a conflict of testimony with respect to defendant's
negligence which was properly left to a jury." Id. at 381.
. 197 N. Y. 430, 90 N. E. 1116 (1910).
1060 N. Y. 133 (1875).
1 D. C. CoDE § 21-326 (1940).
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has homicidal or dangerous tendencies, though not found in a public
place, on the affidavits of two persons and certificates of two
physicians.2 Held, directed verdict for defendant reversed and cause
remanded. Arrest on the advice of one physician is not authorized
by statute. Jilison v. Caprio, 181 F. 2d 523 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
In many jurisdictions, by common law principles, an alleged
mentally ill person may be summarily restrained by a private citizen
without court process, if at the moment he is dangerous to the community or to himself.3 The danger must be present and imminent,4
otherwise the co-existing statutory procedure must be observed.
The restraint may continue for such time as is necessary to procure
a court order for commitment in compliance with statutory procedure. An alleged mentally ill person not manifesting those characteristics may not be restrained and liability for false imprisonment
will exist despite the person's later commitment to a mental hospital. 6
The burden of justifying the summary arrest by proving the urgency
and necessity for the action rests upon the one who caused the restraint.7 Physicians, so acting, must exercise ordinary care and
8
prudence and make the proper examination of the person's sanity,
otherwise the physician may be liable in a tort action because his
duties are not judicial. 9 Confinement, when warranted, for a temporary period pending judicial proceedings is not a deprivation of
the patient's liberty without due process of law.10
Statutory provisions governing the temporary restraint of alleged
mentally ill persons vary markedly with the jurisdiction. The New
York Mental Hygiene Law exemplifies a hospitalization procedure
which balances the protection of the community and the rights of an
alleged mentally ill person, with an absence of the characteristics of
criminal proceedings. It applies to "any person alleged to be menThe rules
tally ill to a degree which warrants institutional care."
of procedure alter with the exigency, and are directed toward an

2 D.

C. CODE § 21-327 (1940).

aLook v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116 (1871) ; Keleher v. Putnam, 60 N. H. 30
(1880); Anderdon v. Burrows et al., 4 Car. & P. 210, 172 Eng. Rep. 674
(1830).
4
Warner v. State, 189 Misc. 51, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 60 (Ct. C1.), reved on
other grounds, 272 App. Div. 954, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 559 (4th Dep't 1947), rezed
on otlwr grounds, 297 N. Y. 395, 79 N. E. 2d 459 (1948).
5
6 Colby v. Jackson, 12 N. H. 526 (1842).
Look v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116 (1871).
Emmerich v. Thorley et al., 35 App. Div. 452, 455, 54 N. Y. Supp. 791,
793 (1st Dep't 1898) ; Scott v. Waken, 3 F. & F. 328, 334, 176 Eng. Rep. 147,
150 (1862).
89 Ayers v. Russell et al., 50 Hun 282, 3 N. Y. Supp. 338 (Sup. Ct. 1888).

Id.at 289, 3 N. Y. Supp. at 341.

20 "The State provides the best system its wisdom suggests, but so long as

it must be administered by men, it cannot guarantee against occasional mistakes." Id. at 287, 3 N. Y. Supp. at 339.
"IN.

Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 70.
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observation period to determine12the extent of the patient's illness and
his need for further treatment.
A patient may voluntarily apply for admission to a state hospital
for a period of observation by signing a request, 13 or a state hospital
may receive a patient on the certificate of one certified medical
examiner 14 and the verified petition 15 of a relative provided the
patient consents. 16 Provision is made to admit a person to a state
hospital, who, in the opinion of the county commissioner of health
or health officer,i" after a personal examination, is dangerous to himThe normal
self or others and needs immediate care and treatment.'
procedure, however, is by application to the judge of a court of
record to order, in his discretion, a patient to a state hospital for an
observation period. 19 Such application must be accompanied by 2 a0
verified petition and certificates of two qualified medical examiners.
If a person is dangerous or where it would be for his benefit to
receive immediate care, an emergency proviso permits admission of
a patient to a state hospital for a period of ten days, upon a21verified
petition and certificates of two certified medical examiners.
In certain overpopulated communities of the state, such as the
City of New York, 22 the procedure for admitting a patient to a city
hospital for observation pending possible hospitalization in state in23
stitutions, has been modified to facilitate the needs of the locality.

A person who, in the opinion of the chief resident alienist, needs
12 Cf. Quarterman v. Quarterman, 179 Misc. 759, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 737 (Sup.
Ct. 1943). The patient was committed to a State hospital pursuant to provisions of the New York Mental Hygiene Law. The court said: "Such a
proceeding has a distinct object in view, to wit, the care and treatment of the
patient and the protection of the public. It is not designed as a substitute for
an inquisition, and an order entered thereon does not effect an adjudication of
incompetency."
'3 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 71.
(A person can be detained for a period
not exceeding 60 days and thereafter until 15 days after receipt of a request to
leave.)
'4 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 19. (A licensed physician with at least three
years practice in his profession who is certified by the judge of a court of
record in a form prescribed by the commissioner of health).
15 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 74. (A statement of facts upon which the
alleged mental illness is based and the reason for the requested order).
'16N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 73; Ops. Ar'r'y GEN. 265 (1946). (A patient
should not be admitted to a state institution pursuant to this section if there is
any objection on the part of such patient.)
17 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 72. (In addition certified examiners duly
designated by either of them may exercise this authority and their names shall
be listed with the department of hygiene.)
18 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 72. (Such period should not exceed 60 days
from and inclusive of the date of the order.)
'1N. Y. MzNT. HYG. LAW § 74.
20 Ibid.
21 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 75.
.2 N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 81.

(This includes the county of Erie and

elsewhere where the state or any political subdivision thereof shall have a
psychopathic hospital or a psychopathic ward of a general hospital.)
23 Ibid.
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immediate care, treatment or observation to ascertain his mental
of Bellevue
condition, may be removed to the psychopathic division
25
Hospital 24 for a period not to exceed sixty days.
It was held in Warner v. State 26 that the New York Mental
Hygiene Law did not abolish or curtail the common law power of
summary arrest and restraint of a mentally ill person when necessary
to prevent him from doing some immediate injury to himself or
others.
Judge Washington's concurring opinion in the principal case
recognizes this co-existing procedure in New York and would apply
the common law rule to mitigate the defendant psychiatrist's liability.
He argues that the defendant be permitted to submit as grounds for
further reduction of damages that he acted in good faith by proving
the patient's need for treatment and that the hospitalization was
beneficial. He does not believe that Congress intended to penalize
physicians "for assuming responsibility and taking the action which
membership in their profession and the welfare of the community
require." 27
It would seem that this view propounds a more sound foundation for deciding cases of this kind as compared to the broad measure
of liability imposed by the majority opinion.
It is submitted in cognizance of the increasing mental health
problem, 28 that existent laws in regard to the procedure of hospitalizing the mentally ill 29 could, in many jurisdictions be modified to
acknowledge improved medical principles and social concepts. 30

INSURANCE RIGHTS OF MORTGAGEE UNDER MORTGAGEE
CLAUSE OF STANDARD NEW YoR FIRE INSURANCE POLICY. -The

plaintiff held a mortgage on a building which the owner-mortgagor
insured with the defendant company. The policy contained a New
24 N. Y. CITY CHARTER, c. 23, § 583. (The psychopathic ward of the hospital must operate under the New York Code of Criminal Procedure, Section
939.)
25

N. Y. MENT. HYG. LAW § 81.

28297 N. Y. 395, 79 N. E. 2d 459 (1948).
27 Jillson v. Caprio 181 F. 2d 523, 525 (D. C. Cir. 1950).
6
28 Arestad and Mc overn, Hospital Service in the United States, 143 A. M.
A. J., No. 1, p. 25. (In 1949 general patients hospitalized in the United
States totaled 1,224,951 and mental patients comprised 675,096 of this total.)
29FERa
A Sicuarn AGENCy, FSA-A4 (1950). (Eleven states permit
temporary admission only after a court order has been obtained. Seven states
still have no provision for temporary admission to a state hospital for observation or for emergency commitment without a court order. Eight states
still have no provision for voluntary admission to state hospitals. Mentally ill
persons may be kept in jail during the commitment process and while awaiting
hospital admission in thirty-five states.)
30 See Note, 56 YArx L. J. 1178 (1947) (excellent analysis of this problem).

